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Introduction
Public policy in the area of water supply stirs conflict, includ-
ing debates over the sustainability of current consumption 
patterns, fights between agricultural and urban interests, 
arguments between those seeking growth and those con-
cerned with environmental impacts, and disputes among 
government agencies over jurisdictional responsibilities. 
Contentment with the status quo can be based on (1) sound 
science that supports water resource policies, (2) accept-
ance of current water allocation procedures and investment 
schemes as being beneficial, (3) agreement on the ethical 
values associated with outcomes, and (4) consensus re-
garding the division of responsibilities among government 
agencies—ensuring continued good performance. When we 
understand the sources of conflict we are in a better position 
to create strategies for addressing complex political issues, 
like water supply policy (Berg, 2005). 
We consider four sources of conflict in policy development 
and implementation: cognitive conflicts (based on techni-
cal disagreements regarding how scientific data might be 
interpreted), interest conflicts (where stakeholders obtain 
different benefits and costs under alternative policies), val-
ues conflicts (involving ideology or personal preferences 
regarding outcomes), and authority conflicts (stemming 
from jurisdictional disagreements). These potential sources 
of conflict characterize most politically-charged situations, 
with water supply management illustrating the interplay of 
these forces. 
The analysis presented here utilizes Thacher and Rein’s 
(2004) catalogue of alternative government strategies for 
addressing value conflicts. They survey four approaches 
taken by governments: “balancing” competing goals, cy-
cling between different objectives, making different agen-
cies responsible for meeting specific goals, and relying on 
precedents to make decisions. The approaches are taken in 
response to the other three sources of conflict as well.  After 
summarizing these strategies, I outline sources of conflict in 
the area of water supply management. This study surveys the 
contributions of different disciplines in resolving technical 
issues (cognitive conflicts), indicating how these professional 
perspectives tend to be associated with specific strategies. 
My analysis attempts to improve our understanding of the 
link between sources of conflict and resulting government 
strategies for addressing policy issues.  
Strategies for managing conflicts
Public policy establishes the legal constraints facing deci-
sion-makers and determines the jurisdictional responsibilities 
of different levels of government. Economists argue that 
market imperfections (market power and information gaps) 
and market failures (such as pollution or misuse of common 
property resources, like water) can justify some form of 
government intervention to improve sector performance. 
Water policies tend to address four broad areas: water 
resource supply, operations of water/wastewater utilities 
and other water users, environmental impacts of water use, 
and the scientific basis for evaluating health and ecological 
consequences. Government intervenes when economic or 
social problems catch the attention of policy actors. Politi-
cians then craft legislation and create administrative agencies 
to implement the laws. The courts rule on the legality of 
different arrangements when laws come into conflict or are 
challenged in terms of constitutionality. Thus, pressure for 
changes in public policy builds as water sector performance 
falls short of expectations. The relative roles of markets and 
government shift when citizens lack confidence in current 
It can be argued that there are four sources of conflict in policy development and implementation: cognitive conflicts (based 
on technical disagreements regarding how scientific data might be interpreted), interest conflicts (where stakeholders 
obtain different benefits and costs under alternative policies), values conflicts (involving ideology or personal preferences 
regarding outcomes), and authority conflicts (stemming from jurisdictional disagreements). These potential sources of 
conflict characterize most politically-charged situations, with water supply management illustrating the interplay of these 
forces.  Strategies for managing the four conflicts are reviewed:  “balancing” competing goals, cycling between different 
objectives, making different agencies responsible for meeting specific goals, and relying on precedents to make decisions. 
Benchmarking (despite its limitations) is shown to be an important tool in conflict resolution, as it documents past perform-
ance, establishes baselines for gauging improvements, and makes comparisons across service providers.       
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institutional or jurisdictional arrangements, when new social 
concerns (or crises) arise, or when social goals or values 
are re-evaluated. 
Goals can be complementary or conflicting: the latter 
require that policy choices focus on one objective to the 
detriment of others. Thacher and Rein (2004) note that the 
instrumentalist approach (as with cost-benefit analysis) ex-
presses outcomes in terms of a common metric: values are 
taken to be commensurable, so a single overarching objective 
function is used for comparing outcomes associated with 
alternative policies. Economists are generally comfortable 
with this framework, although incorporating risk into stud-
ies requires analysts to characterize that risk and assign a 
risk premium for evaluating net present values. Whether 
political leaders are as comfortable with this approach is 
another question altogether: “When a policy actor encounters 
a new situation in which its goals conflict, it may find that 
its preferences are simply unfinished. Existing models of 
policy rationality have great difficulty in accommodating 
such situations.” (Thacher and Rein, 2004, p. 458)1  
They go on to describe three other strategies utilized by 
policy actors for coping with ambiguity: “. . . they cycle 
between competing values over time; they assign primary 
responsibility for pursuing each value to a separate institu-
tion; or they eschew general decisions about the relative 
merits of two goals, preferring case-by-case resolutions of 
particular problems that draw on analogical reasoning and 
situated judgment.” (p. 458) Although these strategies do 
not require commensurability among values, they can yield 
valuable information about the impacts of focused policies 
and citizen attitudes toward outcomes: “In this sense, com-
mensurability at best results from the response to value [or 
other] conflict rather than guiding it.” (p. 458) 
Cost-Benefit Analysis: With its emphasis on efficiency 
and the creation of net economic benefits, this framework is 
often used to eliminate strategies that warrant further attention 
from political actors.2 Its advantages include the ability to 
incorporate multiple impacts into a single summary statistic. 
However, when there are conflicts regarding values (the 
ultimate weights to be given different objectives), political 
systems are not likely to depend on cost-benefit analysis: 
efficiency is not going to be acceptable as an ultimate value. 
In addition, using money as a common denominator violates 
some ethical principles.3
Cycling Between Competing Values: By focusing 
sequentially on specific values, policies are implemented 
1Thacher and Rein (2004) focus on the rationality of alternatives to the 
instrumentalist framework.  The present study uses the water sector to 
illustrate how the sources of conflict partly determine the policy strategy 
most likely to meet citizen values over the long run.
2A colleague who served on the Council of Economic Advisors, when asked 
what he did during his term of service, replied: “I killed dumb ideas.”  The 
use of a cost-benefit analysis can screen out poor policies.
that improve performance along one dimension at a time. 
However, this means that in the interim other values are 
neglected. Once the negative consequences become unac-
ceptable, the other value is given priority. This approach 
leads to action toward meeting one objective, but yields 
information about side effects. This approach “. . . may fa-
cilitate the invention of new strategies so that they become 
progressively more sophisticated in the way they handle the 
dilemma over time.” (Thacher and Rein, 2004, p. 463) For 
example, environmentalists might argue that it is time to give 
priority to ecological systems because a tough policy would 
likely result in technological and organizational innovations, 
allowing other goals to be met. They might argue that the 
system has become locked into weak performance along this 
valued dimension of performance. From their perspective, 
delaying a water policy shift toward meeting environmental 
objectives might lead to further irreversible damages inflicted 
by residential, commercial, and industrial development. On 
the other hand, a delay might be used to improve the science 
of water supply management, improving the data for deci-
sion-making and lowering the costs of meeting objectives. In 
his case study of water industry regulation, Maloney (2001) 
describes such policy cycling as being “episodic.” Note that 
flip-flopping on policies can weaken citizen confidence in 
the political system and introduce greater policy uncertainty 
into the equation—raising the cost of capital. 
Compartmentalization through Specialized Agencies: 
The need for specialized skills and regular interactions with 
particular constituencies is one reason for creating agencies 
that pursue particular values. It simplifies policy design, 
since multiple objectives would require multiple policy 
instruments. This strategy ensures that each value will have 
a strong champion responsible for putting forward specific 
claims on society: organizational firewalls avoid having 
to consider multiple values. When agencies are assigned 
multiple tasks they are forced to make trade-offs that might 
be viewed as unacceptable or involving excessive internal 
conflict. Thus, in the water sector, environmental agencies, 
health agencies, resource management agencies, and util-
ity regulators focus on different objectives: environmental 
protection, public health, sustainability, and efficiency 
(and low prices), respectively. These agencies are in a 
position to collaborate to ensure that policies are consist-
ent. For example, a recent Memorandum of Understanding 
3Greer (1993) notes, “Teleological standards are typically concerned with 
ends that are continuously variable, subject to balancing, and offer oppor-
tunities of comparison.” (p. 10)  He distinguishes between “. . . teleological 
standards, which focus on the nonmoral outcomes or results of acts or rules, 
and imperative standards, which hold that certain acts or rules are right or 
wrong in themselves, regardless of the economic or other consequences.” 
(p. 12) Not only do citizens care about both the means and the ends, they 
also accept nonteleological or imperative standards, where trade-offs are 
not acceptable: “Thou shalt not kill” illustrates one such moral judgment 
on human behavior.  
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among water agencies in Florida illustrates this outcome. 
Alternatively, agencies might participate in jurisdictional 
conflicts as they battle one another in the court system or 
the legislative arena—determining primacy (Nicholson-
Crotty, 2005). Maloney (2001) describes how the division 
of labor among water agencies in England and Wales led to 
the water utility regulator (OFWAT) fighting the National 
Rivers Authority (and its successor, Environmental Agency) 
to delay the implementation of the European Community 
Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive. The process led to 
some balancing of the objectives pursued in a single-minded 
way by each agency. Nevertheless, cost containment and 
lower prices were given priority, relative to meeting tighter 
water quality standards.  
Case-by-Case Resolution: A fourth approach (labeled 
casuistry by Thacher and Rein) involves political actors 
avoiding general decisions regarding the weights to be as-
signed different values. Rather, the approach incorporates 
arguments based on how the current situation is similar to 
or different from previous situations that generated specific 
policy responses. This strategy requires that the agency 
consider conflicting values simultaneously. Staff reason on 
the basis of analogies rather than from first principles: “In 
this respect casuistry resembles contemporary jurisprudence, 
where the meaning of vague legal provisions like ‘due 
process’ and the proper resolution of conflicts among them 
are worked out case-by-case by drawing analogies with 
established legal precedents.” (Thacher and Rein, 2004, p. 
477)  This strategy would seem to be a very nuanced (and 
flexible) approach to problem-solving; rather than striking 
a balance in terms of abstract principles, facts, and actors to 
determine the decision regarding specific policies.
Sources of Conflict
A quarter of a century ago, Bill Lord (1979) outlined sources 
of conflict in the water resources planning arena: cogni-
tive, interest, and value conflicts. To these three, Leonard 
Shabman (2005) has added authority conflicts—where the 
political jurisdiction suitable for developing and implement-
ing policy is not established or authority is unclear. Let us 
take these in order.
“Cognitive” conflicts are disputes over factual matters: 
“What is?” For example, what happens to water consump-
tion per household under a particular conservation program? 
Technical disagreements reflect cognitive conflicts. Such 
conflicts can be reduced through comprehensive data col-
lection and analysis. Investment in the production of new 
scientific knowledge improves the scientific basis for policy 
by providing a better understanding of physical and behavioral 
relationships required for modeling water systems and for 
developing water policy.
“Interest” conflicts reflect the differential impacts of 
policies on various stakeholder groups: “For whom is the 
policy?” If the situation is actually a zero-sum game, one 
group benefits at another’s expense. If there is no compensa-
tion for lost economic (or social) values due to the policy, 
those harmed will fight the policy. For example, granting 
a consumption use permit to a set of agricultural interests 
can mean that a water utility is forced to go to higher cost 
sources—such as desalinization. The political economy of 
regulation suggests that when the beneficiaries of a particular 
policy are concentrated (and per capita benefits are high) and 
the losers are diffuse (and the per capita damages are low), 
rational investments in political lobbying are likely to result 
in policies that benefit well-organized stakeholders—even 
when the costs to the losers outweigh the benefits to the 
winners. Thus, special interests articulate their views and 
are able to influence laws and their implementation.  
“Values” conflicts are more ideological in nature, reflect-
ing the different preferences or values of groups. Here, there 
may not be a political consensus over the weight assigned 
to particular outcomes, especially outcomes involving non-
monetary impacts. Thus, the choice between environmental 
quality and economic growth can depend on one’s income 
and personal values. Improved technical understanding of 
the implications of alternative water policies need not resolve 
“interest” or “values” conflicts. Both involve “What should 
be?” rather than “What is?” or “What are the consequences?” 
Thacher and Rein (2004) focused on this type of conflict, 
although their insights apply to the other sources as well.
“Authority” conflicts are based on different views regarding 
where decisions will or ought to be made.4 When an issue 
arises, the jurisdiction may not yet be assigned or the issue 
might be addressed by multiple agencies. When there is lack 
of clarity, stakeholders will go jurisdiction-shopping—se-
lecting the agency or the level of government most likely 
to support its interests in policy design and implementation. 
Appeals procedures within the judicial system can delay 
implementation. In such situations, benefits delayed are 
(effectively) benefits denied.
These conflicts characterize most on-going policy issues. 
Water policy is particularly sensitive to public opinion be-
cause the sector significantly affects citizens.5 In addition, 
stakeholders (such as agricultural and industrial interests or 
environmental coalitions) are often politically powerful. The 
range of concerns means that political coalitions (based on 
regional alliances or ideological predispositions) form around 
issues and support policy initiatives that meet their concerns. 
Some groups focus on social justice (or fairness), particularly 
regarding the effect of water prices on low-income citizens. 
Others worry about environmental impacts associated with 
water usage and seek investments in research and develop-
ment and conservation to reduce those impacts. 
4Heikkila (2004) combines common-pool resource management theory and 
local public choice theory in a thoughtful empirical study of jurisdictional 
issues in California water programs.  She shows that jurisdictional collabo-
ration can be facilitated by functionally specialized institutions established 
to address shared problems. Leach, Pelkey, and Sabatier (2002) describe 
consensus-seeking water partnerships in California and Washington.  
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Reasons NOT to engage in 
benchmarking
Since the purpose of this paper is to strengthen regulatory 
and managerial capabilities in conflict resolution via per-
formance benchmarking, it is useful to develop the case 
against benchmarking. Studies that are poorly done or 
misinterpreted can lead to establishing inappropriate targets 
and poor incentives for WSS utilities.  Metric benchmarking 
utilizes quantitative techniques: the results are only as good 
as the underlying data and models utilized in the analysis. 
We know that both data and models present problems. Avail-
able data may not capture reality, and where the numbers 
are “correct”, key factors affecting costs and output may be 
omitted from the analysis. The model’s results may be very 
sensitive to specification. 
“If you torture the data, they will confess.” Thus, if the group 
conducting the study lacks technical skills, the absence of 
sound statistical procedures will yield misleading results. 
The idea behind benchmarking is well developed on theo-
retical grounds; furthermore, it has an admirable objective. 
However, in practice, the results can be distorted. There 
are still many problems with the various methodologies, 
which supports postponing studies until the data can be 
fully audited and analysts achieve more agreement regard-
ing which methodologies should be applied in particular 
circumstances. 
Some of the potential shortcomings of current practice in 
performance benchmarking are listed below:
Information Asymmetries: Benchmarking requires sig-
nificant amounts of data that are often quite difficult to 
collect. It also depends on the accuracy of the data that are 
collected. The information collected may be verified by the 
regulator (or analyst), but this usually comes at some cost. 
In additional, some data are unverifiable by the regulator 
or extremely costly to acquire. From this point of view, the 
regulator has to trust the firm regarding the truthfulness and 
accuracy of reported data. We then end up in a situation of 
severe information asymmetry: the fundamental problem of 
regulation. Recall that the principle behind of benchmarking 
is that regulators cannot rely solely on the information pro-
vided by the firm when designing its regulatory framework 
(including targets and incentives). Since the utility benefits 
from having private information, regulators would like to 
avoid such dependence when designing targets for a rate of 
return based price structure or a price cap regime (includ-
ing an X-factor). However, if a benchmarking methodology 
still requires information from the firm, one can argue that 
we have gained little by choosing this more sophisticated 
method.
Sensitivity to model specification: Quantitative tech-
niques utilized by most benchmarking methodologies 
produce dramatically different results under similar circum-
stances. A quick review to the literature on benchmarking 
reveals that conclusions (such as performance rankings or 
scores) differ considerably, depending on the variables cho-
sen, on the particular methodology applied, on the interval 
of time considered, as well as other factors that need to be 
determined for a benchmarking study. This point applies 
to all the methodologies used: from simple ratio analyses 
to sophisticated quantitative techniques (such as ordinary 
least squares, stochastic frontier analysis, Data Envelopment 
Analysis, and distance functions). This observation raises 
questions about how reliable a benchmarking process can be, 
especially when we realize that performance comparisons 
affect the economic foundations and financial sustainabil-
ity of a company that is usually the sole provider of WSS 
service in a particular geographic area. This important issue 
brings into question the use of complicated mathematical 
algorithms that are sensitive manipulation.
Unique situations: The operating environment is seldom 
the same: every firm is different even when there might be 
utilities providing the same service-mix in similar areas. 
There is always a particular input, geographic feature, or 
specific technological consideration that differs from one 
firm to the other, raising doubts about the possibility of a fair 
comparison between the two WSS utilities. Inherited infra-
structure is one of these features, since it is rare to see firms 
starting from zero and building entire networks and facilities 
as a Greenfield activity. In the case of privatized WSS utili-
ties, the utilities inherited fixed assets already designed and 
installed years or decades ago. Publicly owned utilities have 
generally received soft loans or grants in the past, leading to 
networks that reflected past political priorities. 
Single Performance Indicator: Given the multiple 
dimensions of WSS output and inter-temporal considera-
tions, coming up with a single performance index may be 
impossible. So-called “total methods” (regression analysis) 
can still yield problematic performance scores. For example 
one utility could keep costs down by not performing mainte-
nance, but the consequences for costs in the future could be 
dramatic. Another utility might be engaging in an expansive 
capacity development program for employees, which will 
have payoffs in the future, but place the company in the “high 
cost” category at present. To capture some service quality 
elements, customer surveys might be used to supplement 
production data: citizen evaluations matter. However, we 
know that “Believing is seeing,” which suggests that cus-
5The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated in 1997 that 
water infrastructure in the U.S. (including pipes for drinking water and 
wastewater collection) needed $138 billion over 20 years.  The American 
Water Works Association reviewed the water distribution network issues 
and re-estimated the need to be $360 billion for the period.  In 2000, the 
Water Infrastructure Network published a report estimating nearly $1 trillion 
in investments would be needed over two decades.  Such estimates may 
be inflating the dollars to justify massive federal programs. However, they 
suggest the water utility component of the water problem is non-trivial. 
Add to this number the costs of operating utility systems, promoting greater 
security, agricultural run-off, wetlands destruction, and related issues, and 
the water sector presents a set of high profile policy problems.  
BERG
107
tomer perceptions might be unduly influenced by attitudes 
(reflecting past performance or some highly publicized 
event). No ideal index has been developed. 
This list of doubts about the fair applicability of benchmark-
ing techniques could be easily extended. Such concerns are 
quite important and must be addressed by those conducting 
(and using) performance comparisons. Perhaps the best 
response to these concerns is the following observation:
“If not now, when? If not here, then where?” Bench-
marking is fundamental requirement of good management. 
If regulators cannot identify historical trends, determine 
today’s baseline performance, and quantify relative perform-
ance across WSS utilities, then they may as well be writing 
“pretty poetry”. 
Concluding observations
Since efficiency evaluation plays such an important role 
in incentive regulation, regulators should be careful of the 
ranking techniques adopted from among parametric and 
non-parametric evaluation models. First of all, regulators 
should figure out what they really want to compare. They 
might want to focus only on cost minimization In this case, 
they can choose from among the regression model, COLS 
(corrected ordinary least square), SFA production (cost) 
function model or single output DEA models. If regulators 
want to measure other outputs simultaneously, such as cus-
tomer density and quality of service, they can choose to use 
a synthetic evaluation system (like SUNASS), DEA models 
or SFA input (output) distance function models. There is 
some evidence of consistency of the efficiency measurement 
within specific groups of models, such as single or multiple 
output groups, but studies need to check this out.
Thus, regulators should be aware of the advantages and 
shortages of different models and choose the most appropri-
ate ones to do the benchmarking and evaluation. Different 
approaches include Performance Indicators that capture key 
ratios (such as labor productivity or water losses). In most 
cases, these partial indicators are then aggregated to deter-
mine “overall” performance. A second approach involves 
performance scores based on production and cost regressions 
utilize sophisticated quantitative techniques for determining 
the relative rankings of utilities. Third, some countries use 
engineering (or “model company”) approaches to determine 
relative performance. In addition, process benchmarking 
and customer survey benchmarking represent two other 
methodologies used to gauge performance. 
In the case of Overall Performance Indicators (OPIs) as 
used by SUNASS (Peru) and SEAWUN (Southeast Asia), 
the components are generally assigned equal weights. This 
weighting is arbitrary and not convincing. Nevertheless, 
many regions of the world have adopted this method as a 
first step in a more comprehensive approach to efficiency 
analysis.
Regression models focus on the cost efficiency of a com-
pany, but can fail to consider other important factors such 
as quality of service, coverage of service, and financial 
sustainability of current prices. Nor does OLS consider the 
effect of the random shock or statistical noise. In addition, 
an inherent problem of regression analysis is that it requires 
specification of functional form, which risks fitting in an 
inappropriate function. Furthermore, regression analysis 
is limited to only one dependent variable, which might not 
depict the real world in a sophisticated way. 
DEA models do not have these limitations. DEA does not 
require the specification of a functional form to be fitted, nor 
does it need to impose weight to the factors. DEA allows 
for multiple outputs and inputs. For example, dimensions of 
service quality can be included in the analysis. In addition, 
DEA analysis can give us more information than the ranking. 
It can also be used to evaluate returns to scale and can set 
a goal for inefficient companies regarding how much they 
should improve to get on the efficient frontier. However, 
DEA models are not perfect either. 
The outcome of DEA analysis is sensitive to the selection 
of the models and different DEA methods. And DEA has 
been developed in a non-statistical framework, so hypothesis 
testing is problematic In addition, DEA does not account for 
possible noise. SFA is arguably a better method. It accounts 
for the effect of the random shocks and statistical noise and 
can accommodate multiple inputs and outputs by using the 
distance function. However, it also has potential problems; 
in particular, the standard SFA method uses a specific as-
sumption on the residual skewness to separate inefficiency 
from measurement errors. 
Third, regulators can select two to three appropriate 
techniques to construct models, conducting a three-level 
consistency tests to compare the outcomes of different 
methods and decide whether the model chosen is needed or 
not. If the study involves panel data, regulators should also 
check whether these efficiency measures are consistent over 
time. If the consistency tests are satisfied, the regulator can 
choose one of the techniques that is most intuitive. If the 
tests are not satisfied, extra emphasis should be put on the 
companies with coincident ranking and with totally opposite 
rankings. In these ways, regulators can provide a relatively 
fair and convincing ranking to inform the public. 
While benchmarking is not a panacea for overcoming 
impediments to public and private infrastructure invest-
ment, it does provide key inputs into public policy debates 
and managerial evaluations, with wide-ranging implications 
for the following:
• Sustainability of capital inflows, public deficits, and 
reform initiatives;
• Poverty reduction and public perceptions regarding 
infrastructure reforms; 
• Development and implementation of incentives for 
improving WSS service performance; and
• Appropriate roles for multinational organizations, donor 
nations, and regional cooperation in the provision of WSS 
services.
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The strengths and limitations of benchmarking method-
ologies need to be understood by those engaged in reform-
ing, regulating, and managing water and sewerage service 
utilities. To date, data specification, collection, and collation 
has been the focus of benchmarking programs. With several 
years of consistent data available for many utilities, the is-
sue becomes one of how to utilize the data (including core 
indicators) in evaluating utility performance and rewarding 
those managers responsible for improvements. 
Furthermore, benchmarking and other forms of perform-
ance monitoring are absolutely essential if conflicts are to 
be resolved in a convincing and an amicable manner. Sci-
ence-based studies can resolve technical issues—limiting 
the role of cognitive conflicts. Getting the facts out to the 
general public (transparency) can also limit the destructive 
power of special interest conflicts: program beneficiaries 
can be clearly identified and resource allocations re-evalu-
ated if the outcomes do not mesh with stated objectives. 
Values conflicts are unlikely to be resolved by numbers 
or performance comparisons. However, strong incentives 
(based on performance) can generate win-win options that are 
unavailable in inefficient systems, diffusing some ideologi-
cal disputes. Finally, authority conflicts will ultimately be 
resolved within the broader political system. Cross-country 
comparisons and data on domestic performance trends can 
help political leaders appreciate the importance of legal 
clarity in the water/wastewater sector.
Benchmarking represents an important tool for document-
ing past performance, establishing baselines for gauging 
improvements, and making comparisons across service 
providers. In the water sector particularly, valid compari-
sons can contribute to improved performance. Rankings can 
inform policymakers, the providers of investment funds, 
and customers regarding the cost effectiveness of different 
service providers. They also can serve as the basis for incen-
tive systems that can promote cost containment, enhance 
service quality, and finance network expansion. Ultimately, 
such improvements in sector performance are what citizens 
and policy-makers seek. 
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